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Abstract
Description logics (DLs) are well-known knowledge representation formalisms focused on the
representation of terminological knowledge. Due to their first-order semantics, these languages
(in their classical form) are not suitable for representing and handling uncertainty. A proba-
bilistic extension of a light-weight DL was recently proposed for dealing with certain knowledge
occurring in uncertain contexts. In this paper, we continue that line of research by introducing
the Bayesian extension BALC of the propositionally closed DL ALC. We present a tableau-based
procedure for deciding consistency, and adapt it to solve other probabilistic, contextual, and gen-
eral inferences in this logic. We also show that all these problems remain ExpTime-complete, the
same as reasoning in the underlying classical ALC. Under consideration in Theory and Practice
of Logic Programming (TPLP).
1 Introduction
Description logics (DLs) (Baader et al. 2007) are a family of logic-based knowledge repre-
sentation formalisms designed to describe the terminological knowledge of an application
domain. Description Logics have been successfully applied to model several domains,
with some particularly successful applications coming from the biomedical sciences. This
is due to their clear syntax, formal semantics, the existence of efficient reasoners, and
their expressivity. However, in their classical form, these logics are not capable of dealing
with uncertainty, which is an unavoidable staple in real-world knowledge. To overcome
this limitation, several probabilistic extensions of DLs have been suggested in the lit-
erature. The landscape of probabilistic extensions of DLs is too large to be covered in
detail in this work. These logics differentiate themselves according to their underlying
logical formalism, their interpretation of probabilities, and the kind of uncertainty that
they are able to express. For a relevant survey, where all these differences are showcased,
we refer the interested reader to (Lukasiewicz and Straccia 2008). More recent work
where probabilistic DLs are discussed can be found in (Ceylan and Lukasiewicz 2018;
Gutie´rrez-Basulto et al. 2017).
A related probabilistic DL, called BEL(Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2017), is the Bayesian
extension of the light-weight EL (Baader et al. 2005). This logic focuses on modelling
certain knowledge that holds only in some contexts, together with uncertainty about
∗ Part of this work was carried out while this author was at the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy.
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the current context. BEL is based on a subjective interpretation of probabilities or, in
Halpern’s terminology, it corresponds to a Type II probabilistic logic (Halpern 1990). One
advantage of the formalism underlying BEL is that it separates the contextual knowledge,
which is de facto a classical ontology, from the likelihood of observing this context, which
can be influenced by external factors. We present a simple example of the importance of
contextual knowledge. Consider the knowledge of construction techniques and materials
that vary through time. In the context of a modern house asbestos and lead pipes are
not observable, while in some classes of houses, built during the 1970s, we observe both.
However, in all contexts we know that asbestos and lead in drinking water have grave
health effects. When confronted with a random house, one might not know to which of
these contexts it belongs, and by extension whether it is safe to live in, or drink the
water that flows through its pipes. Still, construction data may be used to derive the
probabilities of these contexts.
To allow for complex probabilistic relationships between the contexts without need-
ing to result to incompatible independence assumptions, their joint probability distri-
bution is encoded via a Bayesian network (BN) (Pearl 1985). This logic is closely re-
lated to the probabilistic extension of DL-Lite (Artale et al. 2009) proposed previously
in (d’Amato et al. 2008), but uses a less restrictive semantics which resembles more the
open-world assumption from DLs (for a discussion on the differences between the se-
mantics of these logics, see (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2017)). Another similar proposal is
Probabilistic Datalog± (Gottlob et al. 2013), with the difference that uncertainty is rep-
resented via a Markov Logic Network, instead of a BN. Since the introduction of BEL,
the main notions behind it have been generalised to arbitrary ontology languages (Ceylan
2018). However, it has also been shown that efficient and complexity-optimal reasoning
methods can only be achieved by studying the properties of each underlying ontology
language (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2017). Finally, another family of probabilistic DLs using
Type II semantics was proposed in (Gutie´rrez-Basulto et al. 2017), which we refer to as
Prob-DLs. The biggest difference between Bayesian DLs and Prob-DLs is that the latter
models uncertain concepts, while the former models uncertain knowledge. For example,
Prob-DLs can refer to the class of all individuals having a high probability of a disease
infection, but cannot express that an entailment holds with a given probability.
In this paper, we continue with that line of research and study the Bayesian extension
of the propositionally closed DL ALC. As our main result, we present an algorithm, based
on a glass-box modification of the classical tableaux method for reasoning inALC. Our al-
gorithm is able to derive those contexts which are needed to determine the (in)consistency
of a BALC knowledge base. Using this algorithm, we then describe an effective method
for deciding consistency of a BALC knowledge base. We also provide a tight ExpTime
complexity bound for this problem.
This is followed by a study of several crisp and probabilistic variants of the standard
DL decision problems; namely, concept satisfiability, subsumption, and instance checking.
Interestingly, our work shows that all our problems can be reduced to some basic com-
putations over a context describing inconsistency, and hence are ExpTime-complete as
well. These complexity bounds are not completely surprising, given the high complexity
of the classical ALC. However, our tableaux-based algorithm has the potential to behave
better in practical scenarios. This work details and deepens results that have previously
been presented in (Botha 2018; Botha et al. 2018; Botha et al. 2019)
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2 Preliminaries
We start by providing a brief introduction to Bayesian networks and the description logic
(DL) ALC, which form the basis for the probabilistic DL BALC. For a more detailed
presentation of these topics, we refer the interested reader to (Darwiche 2009; Baader
et al. 2017)
2.1 Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks (BNs) are graphical models, which are used for representing the joint
probability distribution (JPD) of several discrete random variables in a compact man-
ner (Pearl 1985). Before introducing these models formally, we need a few definitions.
Given a random variable X, let val(X) denote the set of values that X can take. For
the scope of this paper, we consider only random variables X such that val(X) is finite.
For x ∈ val(X), X = x denotes the valuation of X taking the value x. This notation is
extended to sets of variables in the obvious way. Given a set of random variables V, a
world ω is a set of valuations containing exactly one valuation for every random variable
X ∈ V. In other words, a world specifies an exact instantiation of all the variables in V .
A V -literal is an ordered pair of the form (Xi, x), where Xi ∈ V and x ∈ val(Xi). V -
literals are similar to valuations, but the syntactic difference is introduced to emphasise
their difference in use, as will become clear later. V -literals are a generalisation of Boolean
literals, which are typically denoted as x or ¬x for the Boolean random variable X. For
simplicity, and following this connection, in this paper we will often use the notation
X for (X,T ) and ¬X for (X,F ). A V -context is any set of V -literals. A V -context is
consistent if it contains at most one literal for each random variable. We will often also
call V -contexts primitive contexts.
A Bayesian network is defined as a pair B = (G,Θ) where G = (V,E) is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) and Θ is a set of conditional probability distributions for every
variable X ∈ V given its parents pi(X) on the DAG G; more precisely, this set has the
form Θ = {P (X = x|pi(X) = ~x′) | X ∈ V }.
The BN B specifies a full JPD for the variables in V by considering independence as-
sumptions depicted in the graph G; namely, every variable is (conditionally) independent
of all its non-descendants given its parents. Under this assumption, it is easy to see that
the JPD of V can be computed through the chain rule
P ( ~X = ~x) =
∏
Xi∈V
P (Xi = xi | pi(Xi) = ~xj);
that is, the probability of a world is obtained by multiplying the conditional probabilities
of the valuations found in the tables. We let PB denote the JPD defined by the BN B.
Example 1
Figure 1 depicts a BN with four random variables denoting the likelihood of different
characteristics of a construction: X stands for a post-1986 building, Y for a renovated
building, Z for the presence of lead pipes, and W for the safety of drinking water. The
tables attached to each node are the conditional probability distribution of that node
given its parents. Hence, the BN expresses that a post-1986 building has only probability
0.1 of being renovated.
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X
Y
Z
W
X
0.7
Y
X 0.1
¬X 0.7
Z
X Y 0
X ¬Y 0
¬X Y 0
¬X ¬Y 0.6
W
Z 0.3
¬Z 0.9
Fig. 1. A Bayesian network with four Boolean variables.
The DAG expresses the conditional independence of W and Y given Z. That is, once
that we observe the value of Z (if we know whether a house has lead pipes or not) then
the probability of W is not affected by the knowledge of the renovation status of a house.
Through the chain rule, we can derive e.g.,
P (¬X,¬Y,Z,¬W ) = 0.3 · 0.3 · 0.6 · 0.7 = 0.0378, and
P (X,Y, Z,W ) = 0.7 · 0.1 · 0 · 0.3 = 0.
That is, it is very unlikely to find an old, non-renovated house, with lead pipes, and
unsafe water; and renovated post-1986 houses with safe water cannot have lead pipes.
Note that to express the full JPD of these four variables directly, we would need a table
with 16 rows.
2.2 The Description Logic ALC
ALC is the smallest propositionally closed DL (Baader et al. 2007; Schmidt-Schauß and
Smolka 1991). As with all DLs, its fundamental notions are those of concepts which
correspond to unary predicates of first-order logic, and roles corresponding to binary
predicates. Formally, given the mutually disjoint sets NI , NC , and NR of individual,
concept, and role names, respectively, the class of ALC concepts is built through the
grammar rule
C ::= A | ¬C | C u C | C unionsq C | ∃r.C | ∀r.C,
where A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR.
The knowledge from an application domain is represented through a set of axioms,
which restrict the possible interpretations of concepts and roles. In ALC, axioms are
either general concept inclusions (GCIs) of the form C v D, concept assertions C(a), or
role assertions r(a, b) where a, b ∈ NI , r ∈ NR, and C,D are concepts. An ontology is a
finite set of axioms. As customary in DLs, we sometimes partition an ontology into the
TBox T composed exclusively of GCIs, and the ABox A containing all concept and role
assertions, when it is relevant which kind of axiom is being used.
The semantics of ALC is defined by interpretations akin to the first-order semantics.
An interpretation is a pair of the form I = (∆I , ·I) where ∆I is a non-empty set called
the domain and ·I is the interpretation function that maps every a ∈ NI to an element
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aI ∈ ∆I , every A ∈ NC to a set AI ⊆ ∆I and every r ∈ NR to a binary relation
rI ⊆ ∆I×∆I . This interpretation function is inductively extended to arbitrary concepts
by defining for any two concepts C,D:
• (¬C)I := ∆I \ CI ,
• (C uD)I := CI ∩DI ,
• (C unionsqD)I := CI ∪DI ,
• (∃r.C)I := {δ ∈ ∆I | ∃η ∈ CI .(δ, η) ∈ rI}, and
• (∀r.C)I := {δ ∈ ∆I | ∀η ∈ ∆I .(δ, η) ∈ rI ⇒ η ∈ CI}.
The interpretation I satisfies the GCI C v D iff CI ⊆ DI ; the concept assertion C(a)
iff aI ∈ CI ; and the role assertion r(a, b) iff (aI , bI) ∈ rI . We denote as I |= α if I
satisfies the axiom α. I is a model of the ontology O (denoted by I |= O) iff it satisfies
all axioms in O.
An important abbreviation in ALC is the bottom concept ⊥ := Au¬A, where A is any
concept name. Clearly, this concept stands for a contradiction and, for any interpretation
I, ⊥I = ∅. Similarly, the top concept > := A unionsq ¬A stands for a tautology and >I = ∆I
holds for every interpretation I.
The basic reasoning task in ALC consists in deciding whether a given ontology O is
consistent ; that is, whether there exists a model I of O. This problem is known to be
ExpTime-complete (Schild 1991; Donini and Massacci 2000). Other reasoning problems,
such as subsumption and instance checking, can be polynomially reduced to this one and
hence preserve the same complexity.
Example 2
In ALC it is possible to express the notion that water pipes do not contain lead through
the GCI WaterPipe v ∀contains.¬Lead. In addition, we can express that the object
pipe1 is a water pipe (WaterPipe(pipe1)); that pipe1 contains substance1 by the asser-
tion contains(pipe1, substance1); and that substance1 is in fact lead (Lead(substance1)).
Note that the ontology containing all four axioms is inconsistent.
3 BALC
We now introduce the probabilistic DL BALC, which combines BNs, to compactly express
joint probability distributions, and ALC to express background knowledge. In addition,
BALC can express logical (as opposed to probabilistic) dependencies between axioms.
More precisely, BALC axioms are required to hold only in some (possibly uncertain)
contexts, which are expressed through annotations. The uncertainty of these contexts is
expressed by the BN. These ideas are formalised next.
Definition 3 (KB)
Let V be a finite set of discrete random variables. A V -restricted axiom (V -axiom) is an
expression of the form ακ, where α is an ALC axiom and κ is a V -context. A V -ontology
is a finite set of V -axioms. A BALC knowledge base (KB) over V is a pair K = (O,B)
where B is a BN over V, and O is a V -ontology.
Note that the contexts labelling the axioms, and the variables of the BN from a BALC
KB both come from the same set of discrete random variables V.
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To define the semantics of BALC, we extend the notion of an interpretation from ALC
to also take contexts into account. The probabilities expressed by the BN are associated
to the axioms following the multiple-world approach.
Definition 4 (V -interpretation)
Let V be a finite set of discrete random variables. A V -interpretation is a tuple of the
form V = (∆V , ·V , vV) where (∆V , ·V) is an ALC interpretation and vV is a valuation
function vV : V → ∪X∈V val(X) which maps every X ∈ V to some vV(X) ∈ val(X).
Given a valuation function vV , a Bayesian world ω, and a context κ we use the notation
vV = ω to express that vV assigns to each random variable the same value as it has in
ω; vV |= κ to state that vV(X) = x for all (X,x) ∈ κ; and ω |= κ when there is ω = vV
such that vV |= κ.
Definition 5 (Model)
The V -interpretation V = (∆V , ·V , vV) is a model of the V -axiom ακ (denoted as V |= ακ)
iff (i) vV 6|= κ, or (ii) (∆V , ·V) satisfies α. V is a model of the ontology O iff it is a model
of all axioms in O. In this case, we denote it by V |= O.
It is important to notice at this point that BALC is a generalisation of the classical DL
ALC. Recall that a V -context is a set of V -literals; that is, of pairs (X,x). In particular,
the empty set of literals ∅ is also a V -context. By definition, every valuation function vV
is such that vV |= ∅. This means that the ALC axiom α is equivalent to the V -axiom
α∅. As a whole every ALC ontology can be seen as a V -ontology by simply associating
the empty context to all its axioms. The original ALC ontology and the V -ontology
constructed this way have the same class of models, except that the latter allows for any
arbitrary valuation function in its third component. For brevity, and the reasons just
described, for the rest of this paper we will abbreviate axioms of the form α∅ simply as
α. When it is clear from the context, we will also omit the V prefix and refer only to e.g.
contexts, GCIs, or ontologies.
A V -interpretation—more precisely, its valuation function—refers to only one possible
world of the random variables in V . BALC KBs, on the other hand, have information
about the uncertainty of being in one world or another. In the multiple-world semantics,
probabilistic interpretations combine multiple V -interpretations and the probability dis-
tribution described by the BN to give information about the uncertainty of the axioms,
and their consequences.
Definition 6 (Probabilistic model)
A probabilistic interpretation is a pair of the form P = (J ,PJ ), where J is a finite set
of V -interpretations and PJ is a probability distribution over J such that PJ (V) > 0
for all V ∈ J . The probabilistic interpretation P is a model of the axiom ακ (denoted
by P |= ακ) iff every V ∈ J is a model of ακ. P is a model of the ontology O iff every
V ∈ J is a model of O.
We say that the probability distribution PJ is consistent with the BN B if for every
possible world ω of the variables in V it holds that∑
V∈J ,vV=ω
PJ (V) = PB(ω)
Recall that PB denotes the joint probability distribution defined by the BN B. The
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probabilistic interpretation P is a model of the KB K = (O,B) iff it is a (probabilistic)
model of O, and is consistent with B.
In other words, a probabilistic interpretation describes a class of possible worlds, in which
the knowledge of O is interpreted, and each world is associated with a probability. For
this interpretation to be a model of the KB, it has to satisfy the constraints it requires;
that is, the ontological knowledge must be satisfied in each world, and the probabilities
should be coherent with the distribution from the BN.
Example 7
Consider the KB K = (O,B) where B is the BN depicted in Figure 1, and O is the
ontology
O := { Pipe u ∃contains.Lead v LeadPipe∅,
Pipe v ∀contains.¬LeadX , Pipe v ∀contains.¬LeadY ,
Pipe v ∃contains.LeadZ , Water u ∃hasAlkalinity.Low v ¬DrinkableZ ,
Water v DrinkableW , Water v ¬Drinkable¬W }.
The first axiom provides a partial definition, stating that every pipe which contains lead
is a lead pipe. Note that it is labelled with the empty context, which means that it always
holds. The two axioms in the second row express that pipes in post-1986 (that is, within
the context X) and in renovated buildings (in context Y ) do not contain lead.
The axioms in the third row refer exclusively to the context of lead pipes (Z). In this
case, our knowledge is that pipes do contain lead, and that water with low alkalinity is
not drinkable, as it absorbs the lead from the pipes it travels on. Notice that the axioms
in the second row contradict Pipe v ∃contains.Lead appearing in the third row. This is
not a problem because they are required to hold in different contexts. Indeed, we can
observe from Figure 1 that any context which makes Z, and either X or Y true must have
probability 0. This means that no probabilistic model can contain a world that satisfies
these conditions.
Finally, the last two axioms state that water at a building is drinkable iff we are
in the context of drinkable water (W ). Note that it is important to provide both ax-
ioms in order to guarantee an equivalence. Suppose that we had not included the last
axiom (i.e., Water v ¬Drinkable¬W ). Then, by our semantics, we could still produce a
V -interpretation V whose valuation satisfies ¬W but such that WaterV ∩DrinkableV 6= ∅.
This can only be avoided by the introduction of the last axiom.
It is a simple exercise to verify that this ontology has a model. The smallest probabilis-
tic model of the KB K contains 10 V -interpretations; one for each world with positive
probability.
Recall that V -contexts are also called primitive contexts. This is to emphasise the differ-
ence with what we will, from now on, call complex contexts. Formally, a complex context
φ is a finite non-empty set of primitive contexts. Note that primitive contexts can be
seen as complex ones; e.g., the primitive context κ corresponds to the complex context
{κ}, and we will use them interchangeably when there is no risk of ambiguity.
Given a valuation function vV and a complex context φ = {α1, . . . , αn} we say that vV
satisfies φ (written as vV |= φ) iff vV satisfies at least one αi ∈ φ; in particular, vV |= κ
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iff vV |= {κ}. Thus, for the rest of the paper we assume that all contexts are in complex
form unless explicitly stated otherwise. We emphasise here that for a valuation function
to satisfy a complex context, it suffices that it satisfies one of the simple contexts in
it. Intuitively, a simple context is a conjunction of valuations, while a complex context
is a disjunction of simple contexts. However, one should not forget that the variables
appearing in these contexts can potentially take more than two different values.
Definition 8
Given complex contexts φ = {κ1, . . . , κn} and ψ = {λ1, . . . , λm} we define the operations
φ ∨ ψ := φ ∪ ψ, and
φ ∧ ψ :=
⋃
κ∈φ,λ∈ψ
{κ ∪ λ} = {κ ∪ λ | κ ∈ φ, λ ∈ ψ}.
These operations generalise propositional disjunction (∨) and propositional conjunction
(∧), where disjunction has the property that either one of the two contexts holds and
conjunction requires that both hold.
Given two complex contexts φ and ψ, we say that φ entails ψ (denoted by φ |= ψ) iff
for all vV such that vV |= φ it follows that vV |= ψ. Alternatively φ |= ψ holds iff for
all Bayesian worlds ω such that ω |= φ it follows that ω |= ψ. It is easy to see that for
all worlds ω and complex contexts φ, ψ it holds that (i) ω |= φ ∨ ψ iff ω |= φ or ω |= ψ,
and (ii) ω |= φ ∧ ψ iff ω |= φ and ω |= ψ. Two important special complex contexts are
top (>) and bottom (⊥), which are satisfied by all or no world, respectively. If there
are n consistent primitive contexts κ1, . . . , κn and κ is an inconsistent context, these are
defined as > := {κ1, . . . , κn} and ⊥:= κ.
This concludes the definition of the relevant components of the logic BALC. In the
next section, we study the problem of consistency of a BALC KB, and its relation to
other reasoning problems.
4 Consistency
As for ALC, the most basic decision problem one can consider in BALC is consistency.
Formally this problem consists of deciding whether a given BALC KB K has a proba-
bilistic model or not. To deal with this problem it is convenient to consider the classical
ALC ontologies that should hold at each specific world, which we call the restriction.
Definition 9 (restriction)
Given the BALC KB K = (O,B) and the world ω, the restriction of O to ω is the ALC
ontology defined by
Oω := {α | ακ ∈ O, ω |= κ}.
Recall that a probabilistic model P = (J ,PJ ) of K = (O,B) is a class of classical
interpretations associated to worlds (∆V , ·V , ω), where each is a model of the V -ontology
O. For such an interpretation to be a model of O, it must hold that, for each axiom
ακ ∈ O such that ω |= κ, (∆V , ·V) |= α (see Definition 5). This condition is equivalent to
stating that (∆V , ·V) is a classical model of Oω.
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Example 10
Consider the KB K from Example 7, and the two worlds ω1 = {X,¬Y,¬Z,W} and
ω2 = {X,¬Y,Z,W}. We then have
Oω1 := {Pipe u ∃contains.Lead v LeadPipe,Pipe v ∀contains.¬Lead,
Water v Drinkable}, and
Oω2 := {Pipe u ∃contains.Lead v LeadPipe,Pipe v ∀contains.¬Lead,
Pipe v ∃contains.Lead,Water u ∃hasAlkalinity.Low v ¬Drinkable,
Water v Drinkable}.
Note that both ontologies are consistent, but Oω2 can only be satisfied by interpretations
I such that PipeI = ∅.
In addition to satisfying the restrictions, the probability distribution PJ of a model must
be consistent with the BN B. This means that the probabilities of the interpretations
associated with the world ω must add to PB(ω). Using this insight, we obtain the following
result.
Theorem 11
The BALC KB K = (O,B) is consistent iff for every world ω with PB(ω) > 0 it holds
that Oω is consistent.
Proof
Suppose first that for every world ω such that PB(ω) > 0 the ontology Oω is consistent.
We build a probabilistic model P of K as follows. Given a world ω with PB(ω) > 0, let
Iω = (∆Iω , ·Iω ) be an arbitrary (classical) model ofOω. We construct the V -interpretation
Vω = (∆Iω , ·Iω , ω); that is, the same interpretation Iω, but associated to the world ω.
We claim that Vω |= O. Indeed, take an arbitrary ακ ∈ O. If ω 6|= κ, then Vω |= ακ
trivially. Otherwise, α ∈ Oω and hence (since Iω |= Oω) (∆Iω , ·Iω ) |= α. Let now Ω
be the set of all worlds ω such that PB(ω) > 0. We define the set of V -interpretations
JΩ := {Vω | ω ∈ Ω}, and the probability distribution PJΩ that sets PJΩ(Vω) = PB(ω)
for every ω ∈ Ω. The probabilistic interpretation P = (JΩ,PJΩ) is a model of K.
Conversely, suppose that K is consistent, and let P = (J ,PJ ) be a model of K. Given
a world ω such that PB(ω) > 0, we know that
∑
V∈J ,vV=ω PJ (V) = PB(ω). In particular
this means that there must exist some V = (∆V , ·V , vV) ∈ J such that vV = ω. P |= K
means that V |= O and hence (∆V , ·V) |= Oω. Thus, Oω is consistent.
Based on this result, we can derive a process for deciding consistency that provides a
tight complexity bound for this problem.
Corollary 12
BALC KB consistency is ExpTime-complete.
Proof
Recall that consistency checking in ALC is ExpTime-complete, and that BALC is a
generalisation of ALC. This yields ExpTime-hardness for BALC consistency. To obtain
the upper bound, note that there are exponentially many worlds ω. For each of them, we
can check (classical) consistency of Oω (in exponential time) and that PB(ω) > 0, which
is linear in the size of B by the chain rule.
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The algorithm described in the proof of this corollary is optimal in terms of worst-case
complexity, but it also runs in exponential time in the best case. Indeed, it enumerates
all the (exponentially many) Bayesian worlds, before being able to make any decision.
In practice, it is infeasible to use an algorithm that requires exponential time on every
instance. For that reason, we present a new algorithm based on the tableau method
originally developed for ALC. To describe this algorithm, we need to introduce some
additional notation.
We denote the context that describes all worlds ω such that Oω is inconsistent as φ⊥K.
That is, the context φ⊥K is such that ω |= φ⊥K iff Oω is inconsistent. Moreover, φB is a
context such that ω |= φB iff P (ω) = 0. Theorem 11 states that K is inconsistent whenever
there is a world that models both φ⊥K and ¬φB. This is formalized in the following result.
Theorem 13
Given the BALC KB K = (O,B), let φ⊥K and φB be the contexts described above. Then
K is inconsistent iff φ⊥K ∧ ¬φB is satisfiable.
Proof
K is inconsistent iff there is a world ω such that PB(ω) > 0 and Oω is inconsistent
(Theorem 11) iff ω 6|= φB and ω |= φ⊥K iff ω |= ¬φB ∧ φ⊥K iff ¬φB ∧ φ⊥K is satisfiable.
Example 14
Consider once again the KB K = (O,B) from Example 7, and notice that Oω is consistent
for all worlds ω. Hence φ⊥K = ⊥. In particular, this means that φ⊥K ∧¬φB is unsatisfiable,
and hence K is consistent.
Let now K′ = (O′,B), where O′ = O ∪ {Pipe(pipe1)∅}. We can see that for any world
ω which entails any of the contexts X,Z or Y,Z, O′ω is inconsistent. Hence we have
that φ⊥K′ = {{X,Z}, {Y,Z}}. Looking at the probability tables from B, we also see that
φB = {{X,Z}, {Y,Z}}; that is, any world that satisfies {X,Z} or {Y,Z} must have
probability 0. Thus, φ⊥K′ ∧ ¬φB = ⊥ and K′ is consistent as well.
To decide consistency, it then suffices to find a method which is capable of deriving the
contexts φ⊥K and φB. For the former, we present a variant of the glass-box approach for
so-called axiom pinpointing (Lee et al. 2006; Meyer et al. 2006; Baader and Pen˜aloza
2010), which is originally based on the ideas from (Baader and Hollunder 1995). This
approach modifies the standard tableaux algorithm for ALC—which tries to construct a
model by decomposing complex constraints into simpler ones—to additionally keep track
of the contexts in which the derived elements from the tableau hold. In a nutshell, tableau
algorithms apply different decomposition rules to make implicit constraints explicit. For
axiom pinpointing, whenever a rule application requires the use of an axiom from the
ontology, this fact is registered as part of a propositional formula. In our case, we need
a context, rather than a propositional formula, to take care of the multiple values that
the random variables take. Although the underlying idea remains essentially unchanged,
the handling of these multiple values requires additional technicalities. Before we look
at this algorithm in detail, it is important to keep in mind that the goal is to detect all
the worlds whose restriction is an inconsistent ALC ontology; hence, we are interested in
detecting and highlighting contradictions.
For this algorithm, it will be important to distinguish the terminological portion of the
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u-rule if (C1 u C2)(a)φ ∈ A, and either C1(a)φ or C2(a)φ is A-insertable
then A′ := (A⊕ C1(a)φ)⊕ C2(a)φ
unionsq-rule if (C1 unionsq C2)(x)φ ∈ A, and both C1(a)φ and C2(a)φ are A-insertable
then A′ := A⊕ C1(a)φ, A′′ := A⊕ C2(a)φ
∃-rule if (∃R.C)(a)φ ∈ A, there is no c such that neither R(a, c)φ nor C(c)φ is
A-insertable, and a is not blocked
then A′ := (A⊕R(a, b)φ)⊕ C(b)φ, where b is a new individual name
∀-rule if {(∀R.C)(a)φ, R(a, b)ψ} ⊆ A, and C(b)φ∧ψ is A-insertable
then A′ := A⊕ C(b)φ∧ψ
v-rule if (C v D)φ ∈ O, a appears in A, and (¬C unionsqD)(a)φ is A-insertable
then A′ := A⊕ (¬C unionsqD)(a)φ
Fig. 2. Expansion rules for constructing φ⊥K
ontology (the TBox) from the assertional knowledge (the ABox). From a very high-level
view, the algorithm starts by creating a partial model that satisfies all the constraints
from the ABox, and then uses rules to decompose complex concepts until an actual
valuation (based exclusively on concept names and role names) is reached. Throughout
the process, rules are also used to guarantee that all the constraints from the TBox are
satisfied by the individuals in this model.
The algorithm starts with the ABox A from O. If O contains no assertions, we assume
implicitly that the ABox is {>(a)} for an arbitrary individual name a. Recall that all
the axioms in A are labeled with a context, and we preserve the context at this initial-
isation step. From this point, the algorithm deals with a set of ABoxes A, which are
created and modified following the rules from Figure 4. Throughout the execution of the
algorithm, each assertion in the ABoxes is labelled with a context which, as usual, is
a propositional formula over the context variables; the algorithm modifies these labels
accordingly to store all the relevant information. As a pre-requisite for the execution of
the algorithm, we assume that all concepts appearing in the ontology are in negation
normal form (NNF); that is, only concept names can appear in the scope of a negation
operator. This assumption is made w.l.o.g. because every concept can be transformed
into NNF in linear time by applying the De Morgan laws, the duality of the quantifiers,
and eliminating double negations. Each rule application chooses an ABox A ∈ A and
replaces it by one or two new ABoxes that expand A with new assertions. We explain
the details of these rule applications next.
An assertion αφ is A-insertable iff for all ψ such that αψ ∈ A, φ 6|= ψ. In the expansion
rules, the symbol ⊕ is used as shorthand for the operation
A⊕ αφ :=
{
(A \ {αψ}) ∪ {αφ∨ψ} αψ ∈ A
A ∪ {αφ} otherwise.
The main idea of this operator is to update the contexts in which an assertion is required
to hold. Either the assertion is not already present in the ABox, and hence it is included
with the context obtained by conjoining all the contexts triggering the rule application
or, if the assertion is already present, there are multiple ways to derive the same assertion,
whose contextual causes are all disjoint. Rather than keeping two different assertions in
the ABox, we simply update its label.
Within an ABox A, we say that the individual x is an ancestor of y if there is a chain
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of role assertions connecting x to y; more formally, if there exist role names r1, . . . , rn
and individuals a0, . . . , an with n ≥ 1 such that {ri(ai−1, ai) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ⊆ A, a0 = x,
and an = y. The node x blocks y iff x is an ancestor of y and for every C(y)
ψ ∈ A, there
is a φ such that C(x)φ ∈ A and ψ |= φ; y is blocked if there is a node that blocks it.
The algorithm applies the expansion rules from Figure 4 until A is saturated ; i.e.,
until no rule is applicable to any A ∈ A. We say that the ABox A contains a clash if
{A(x)φ,¬A(x)ψ} ⊆ A for some individual x and concept name A. Informally, a clash
means that the ABox has an obvious contradiction, as it requires to interpret the element
x to belong to the concept A and its negation. We define the context
φA :=
∨
A(a)φ,¬A(a)ψ∈A
φ ∧ ψ,
which intuitively describes the contexts of all the clashes that appear in A. When A is
saturated, we return the context φ⊥K =
∧
A∈A φA expressing the need of having clashes in
every ABox A for inconsistency to follow. This is because each ABox in A is a potential
model, where the multiplicity arises from the non-deterministic choice when decompos-
ing disjunctions unionsq. If all potential choices are obviously contradictory, then no model
can exist. It is important for the correctness of the algorithm to notice that the defini-
tion of a clash does not impose any constraints on the contexts φ and ψ labelling the
assertions A(x) and ¬A(x), respectively. Indeed, A(x) and ¬A(x) could hold in contra-
dictory contexts. In that case, the conjunction appearing in φA would not be affected;
i.e., this clash will not provide any new information about inconsistency. For example, if
A = {WaterPipe(pipe1)X ,¬WaterPipe(pipe1)¬X}, then the context φA is X ∧¬X. This
context cannot be satisfied by any world, meaning that A is not inconsistent.
Informally, the context φ⊥K corresponds to the clash formula (also called pinpointing
formula) for explaining inconsistency of an ALC ontology (Lee et al. 2006; Baader and
Pen˜aloza 2010). The main differences are that the variables appearing in a context are
not necessarily Boolean, but multi-valued, and that the axioms in O are not labelled
with unique variables, but rather with contexts. The correctness of the approach follows
from the fact that each assertion α is labelled with a formula representing the contexts
in which α is necessarily true. Thus, every inconsistent context will be represented in
φ⊥K. Conversely, saturation of the expansion rules guarantees that no other derivations of
inconsistency as possible; otherwise, some rule would still be applicable.
Notice that the expansion rules in Figure 4 generalise the expansion rules for ALC, but
may require new rule applications to guarantee that all possible derivations of a clash
are detected. Indeed, while the classical algorithm never applies a rule where the derived
assertion already exists in the ABox, our modified algorithm may apply the rule if the
label associated to the assertion does not already imply that which will be included.
As observed in (Baader and Pen˜aloza 2007; Baader and Pen˜aloza 2010), one has to
be careful with claims of termination of the modified method, since the additional rule
applications may in fact lead to an infinite execution. Specifically, the modified algorithm
obtained from a terminating tableau is not guaranteed to terminate. However, (Baader
and Pen˜aloza 2010; Pen˜aloza 2009) devised some general conditions, which are sufficient
to guarantee termination of a method modified in this way. Importantly, those conditions
are met whenever the original algorithm deals only with unary and binary assertions, as
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is the case of the ALC algorithm presented here. Hence, our approach is also guaranteed
to terminate. This yields the following result.
Theorem 15
The modified tableau algorithm terminates, and the context φ⊥K is such that for every
world ω, ω |= φ⊥K iff Kω is inconsistent.
The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proofs of correctness and termination of
pinpointing extensions for tableau algorithms from (Baader and Pen˜aloza 2010) only
taking the differences between propositional formulas and contexts into account.
We now turn our attention to the computation of the formula φB. Recall that in a BN,
the joint probability distribution is the product of the conditional probabilities of each
variable given its parents. Hence a world ω can only have probability 0 if it evaluates
some variable in X ∈ V and its parents pi(X) to values x and ~x, respectively, such that
P (X = x | pi(X) = ~x) = 0. Thus, to compute φB it suffices to find out the cells in the
conditional probability tables in Θ with value 0.
Theorem 16
Let B = (V,Θ) be a BN, and define
φB :=
∨
P (X=x|pi(X)=~x)=0
(X,x) ∧ ∧
Y ∈pi(X),Y=y
(Y, y)
 .
Then for every world ω, ω |= φB iff PB(ω) = 0.
Proof
If ω |= φB then there is a variable X such that ω |= (X,x) ∧
∧
Y ∈pi(X),Y=y(Y, y) and
P (X = x | pi(X) = ~x) = 0. By the chain rule it follows that PB(ω) = 0. Conversely,
if 0 = PB(ω) =
∏
X∈V P (X | pi(X)) it must be the case that at least one factor in the
product is 0; but then that factor satisfies a disjunct in φB.
Notice that, in general, the context φB can be computed faster than simply enumerating
all possible worlds. In particular, if the conditional probability tables in Θ contain no
0-valued cell, then φB = ⊥; i.e., it is satisfied by no world.
To summarise, in this section we have shown that deciding inconsistency of a BALC
KB K = (O,B) can be reduced to checking satisfiability of the context φ⊥K ∧¬φB, where
φ⊥K is the context representing all the worlds ω where Oω is inconsistent, and φB is the
context representing all worlds ω with PB(ω) = 0. We then provided a tableaux-like
method for computing φ⊥K, and an enumeration approach for finding φB. We note that,
just like in classical ALC, the tableau algorithm is not optimal in terms of computational
complexity. In fact, although consistency of ALC ontologies is in ExpTime (Donini and
Massacci 2000), the tableau algorithm we use as the basis of our approach runs in double
exponential time; the main reason for this is the unionsq-rule which may duplicate the number
of ABoxes under consideration. We conjecture that it can be implemented in a goal-
directed manner which behaves well in practice, but leave this for future work.
Although consistency is a very important problem to be studied, we are interested also
in other reasoning tasks, which can arise through the use of probabilistic ontologies. In
particular, we should also take into account the contexts and the probabilities provided
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by the BN beyond the question of whether they are positive or not. In the next section we
study variants of satisfiability and subsumption problems, before turning our attention
to instance checking.
5 Satisfiability and Subsumption
In this section, we focus on two problems—satisfiability and subsumption—which depend
only on the TBox part of an ontology, and hence assume for the sake of simplicity that
the ABox is empty. Thus, we will often write a BALC KB as a pair (T ,B) where T is a
TBox and B is a BN. We are in general interested in understanding the properties and
relationships of concepts.
Definition 17
Given two concepts C,D and a BALC KB K, we say that C is satisfiable w.r.t. K iff
there exists a probabilistic model P = (J ,PJ ) of K s.t. CV 6= ∅ for all V ∈ J . We say
that C is subsumed by D w.r.t. K iff for all models P = (J ,PJ ) of K and all V ∈ J
CV ⊆ DV .
It is possible to adapt the well known reductions from the classical case to show that
these two problems are ExpTime-complete.
Theorem 18
Satisfiability and subsumption w.r.t. BALC KBs are ExpTime-complete.
Proof
Let K = (T ,B) and C,D be concepts. It is easy to see that C is subsumed by D w.r.t. K
iff the KB K′ = (T ∪{(Cu¬D)(a)∅},B) is inconsistent, where a is an arbitrary individual
name. Similarly, C is satisfiable iff K′′ = (T ∪ {C(a)∅},B) is consistent.
In the following, we study variants of these problems which take contexts and proba-
bilities into account. For a more concise presentation, we will present only the cases for
subsumption. Analogous results hold for satisfiability based on the fact that for every
ALC interpretation I, it holds that CI = ∅ iff CI ⊆ ⊥I ; hence, an approach that is
similar to the one used to solve subsumption can be used to solve satisfiability. First we
consider additional information about contexts; afterwards we compute the probability
of an entailment, and finally the combination of both kinds of information.
Definition 19 (contextual subsumption)
Let K = (T ,B) be a BALC KB, C,D concepts, and κ a context. C is subsumed by D in
context κ w.r.t. K, denoted as K |= (C v D)κ, if every probabilistic model of K is also a
model of (C v D)κ.
This definition introduces the natural extension of subsumption that considers also the
contexts. Note that in our setting, contexts provide a means to express and reason with
probabilities.
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Definition 20 (subsumption probability)
Let P = (J , PJ ) be a probabilistic model of the KB K, κ a context, and C,D two
concepts. The probability of (C v D)κ w.r.t. P is
PP((C v D)κ) =
∑
V∈J ,V|=(CvD)κ
PJ (V).
The probability of (C v D)κ w.r.t. K is
PK((C v D)κ) = infP|=KPP((C v D)
κ).
We say that C is positively subsumed by D in κ iff PK((C v D)κ) > 0; it is p-subsumed
iff PK((C v D)κ) ≥ p; it is exactly p-subsumed iff PK((C v D)κ) = p; and it is almost
certainly subsumed iff PK((C v D)κ) = 1.
The definition above allows us to consider the problem of probabilistic reasoning. That
is, the probability of a subsumption in a specific model is the sum of the probabilities of
the worlds in which C is subsumed by D in context κ; notice that this trivially includes
all worlds where κ does not hold, by construction (see Definition 5). In the case where K
is inconsistent we define the probability of all subsumptions as 1 to ensure our definition
is consistent with general probability theory (recall that inf(∅) =∞ in general).
When we speak about the probability of a subsumption w.r.t. a BALC KB, we consider
the infimum over the probabilities provided by all possible models of K. The reason for
this is that we want to find the tightest constraint, taking into account the open world
semantics. The infimum is, to a degree, the natural interpretation of the information
that holds in all possible models. When reasoning about probabilities it is not always
important to compute a precise value, but rather find some relevant bounds. Thus, p-
subsumption considers a lower bound, while positive subsumption only cares about the
probability being zero or not (dually, almost-certainty refers to the probability being one
or not). All these decision problems have different applications and properties.
Contextual subsumption is related to subsumption probability in the obvious way.
Namely, a KB K entails a contextual subsumption iff the probability of the subsumption
in K is 1.
Theorem 21
Given a KB K, concepts C and D, and a context κ, it holds that:
K |= (C v D)κ iff PK((C v D)κ) = 1.
Proof
K |= (C v D)κ iff for every probabilistic interpretation P, if P |= K, then P |= (C v D)κ
iff for every probabilistic model P = (I, PI) of K and every V ∈ I, V |= (C v D)κ iff for
every model P of K PP((C v D)κ) = 1 iff infP|=K PP((C v D)κ) = 1.
This is convenient as it provides a method of reusing our results from Section 4, which
finds a context describing inconsistency, to compute subsumption probabilities.
Theorem 22
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Table 1. Worlds ω such that ω |= W and their probability w.r.t the BN from Figure 1.
world ω PB(ω)
X Y Z W 0
X Y ¬Z W 0.063
X ¬Y Z W 0
X ¬Y ¬Z W 0.567
¬X Y Z W 0
¬X Y ¬Z W 0.189
¬X ¬Y Z W 0.0162
¬X ¬Y ¬Z W 0.0108
Let K = (T ,B) be a consistent BALC KB, C,D two concepts, and κ a context. For the
KB K′ = (T ∪ {C(a)κ,¬D(a)κ},B) it holds that
PK((C v D)κ) =
∑
ω|=φ⊥K′
PB(ω) + 1− PB(κ).
Proof
Let O = (T ∪ {C(a)κ,¬D(a)κ}), so K′ = (O,B). For an arbitrary but fixed model
P = (J , PJ ) of K, we have that
PP((C v D)κ) =
∑
V∈J ,V|=(CvD)κ
PJ (V)
=
∑
vV 6|=κ
PJ (V) +
∑
vV |=κ,V|=CvD
PJ (V)
= 1− PB(κ) +
∑
V6|=K′
PJ (V)
≤ 1− PB(κ) +
∑
{V| OvV inconsistent}
PJ (V).
Hence PK((C v D)κ) ≤
∑
ω|=φ⊥K′
PB(ω) + 1 − PB(κ). For the lower bound, it suffices to
build a minimal model of K, where for each world ω we have an interpretation Vω such
that Vω |= C v D iff Oω |= C v D as in the proof of Theorem 11.
Example 23
Returning to our running example with the KB K from Example 7, suppose that we are
interested in finding the probability of water being drinkable. That is, we want to compute
PK((Water v Drinkable)∅). Since PB(∅) = 1, Theorem 22 states that it suffices to find the
probabilities of all worlds ω such that the restriction of O ∪ {Water(a),¬Drinkable(a)}
to ω is inconsistent. We note that the only such worlds are those which satisfy W . Hence,
PK((Water v Drinkable)∅) =
∑
ω|=W
PB(ω).
Those worlds, and their probabilities, are shown in Table 1. Adding all these values we
get that the probability is 0.8460. In other words, according to our model, the probability
of a building having drinkable water (in the absence of any other information) is very
high.
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Notice that the formula φ⊥K′ requires at most exponential space on the size of T to be
encoded. For each of the exponentially many worlds, computing PB(ω) requires poly-
nomial time due to the chain rule. Hence, overall, the computation of the subsumption
probabilities requires exponential time. Importantly, this bound does not depend on how
φ⊥K′ was computed; it could have e.g. been computed through the process described in
Corollary 12. This provides an exponential upper bound for computing the probability
of a subsumption.
Corollary 24
The probability of a subsumption w.r.t. a KB can be computed in exponential time on
the size of the KB.
Obviously, an exponential-time upper bound for computing the exact probability of a
subsumption relation immediately yields an ExpTime upper bound for deciding the other
problems introduced in Definition 20 as well. All these problems are also generalisations
of the subsumption problem in ALC. More precisely, given an ALC TBox T , we can
create the BALC KB K = (T ′,B) where T ′ contains all the axioms in T labelled with
the context x and B contains only one Boolean node x that holds with probability 1.
Given two concepts C,D T |= C v D iff C is almost certainly subsumed by D in context
x. Since subsumption in ALC is already ExpTime-hard, we get that all these problems
are ExpTime-complete.
In practice, however, it may be too expensive to compute the exact probability when
we are only interested in determining lower bounds, or the possibility of observing an
entailment; for instance, when considering positive subsumption. Recall once again that,
according to our semantics, a contextual GCI (C v D)κ will hold in any world ω such that
ω 6|= κ. Thus, if the probability of this world is positive (PB(ω) > 0), we can immediately
guarantee that PK((C v D)κ) > 0. Thus, positive subsumption can be decided without
any ontological reasoning for any context that is not almost certain. In all other cases,
the problem can still be reduced to inconsistency.
Theorem 25
Let K = (T ,B) be a consistent KB. The concept C is positively subsumed by D in
context κ w.r.t. K iff K′ = (T ∪ {C(a)κ,¬D(a)κ},B) is inconsistent or PB(κ) < 1.
Proof
Assuming that K is consistent, if PB(κ) < 1, the result is an immediate consequence of
Theorem 22. Otherwise, PB(κ) = 1, and since K is consistent, inconsistency of K′ can
only arise from the two new assertions, which means that κ |= φ⊥K′ and in particular∑
ω|=φ⊥K′
PB(ω) = 1.
This theorem requires the context κ to be specified to decide positive subsumption. If κ is
not known before hand, it is also possible to leverage the inconsistency decision process,
which is the most expensive part of this method; recall that otherwise we only need φB,
which can be easily computed from B. Let K∅ := (T ∪ {C(a)∅,¬D(a)∅},B). That is,
K∅ extends K with assertions negating the subsumption relation, which should hold in
all contexts. From Theorem 15 we conclude that φ⊥K∅ encodes all the contexts in which
C v D must hold. Notice that the computation of φ⊥K∅ does not depend on the context
κ but can be used to decide positive subsumption for any context.
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Corollary 26
The concept C is positively subsumed by D in context κ w.r.t. K = (T ,B) iff κ entails
φ⊥K∅ or PB(κ) < 1.
Considering the probabilities of contextual subsumption relations may lead to unex-
pected or unintuitive results arising from the contextual semantics. Indeed, it always
holds (see Theorem 25) that PK((C v D)κ) ≥ 1−PB(κ). In other words, the probability
of a subsumption in a very unlikely context will always be very high, regardless of the KB
and concepts used. In essence, this is caused because the semantics of contextual sub-
sumption impose a variation of a material implication—if κ holds, then the subsumption
holds—which is vacuously true if the premise (if κ holds) is false. In some cases, it may
be more meaningful to consider a conditional probability under the assumption that the
context κ holds, as defined next.
Definition 27 (conditional subsumption)
Let P = (J , PJ ) be a probabilistic model of the KB K, κ, λ two contexts with PB(λ) > 0,
and C,D two concepts. The conditional probability of (C v D)κ given λ w.r.t. P is
PP((C v D)κ | λ) =
∑
V∈J ,vV |=λ,V|=(CvD)κ PJ (V)
PB(λ)
.
The conditional probability of (C v D)κ given λ w.r.t. K is
PK((C v D)κ | λ) = infP|=KPP((C v D)
κ | λ).
This definition follows the same principles of conditioning in probability theory, but
extended to the open world interpretation provided by our model-based semantics. Notice
that, in addition to the scaling factor PB(λ) in the denominator, the nominator is also
differentiated from Definition 20 by considering only the worlds that satisfy the context
λ already.
Notice that the conditional probabilities in Definition 27 are pretty similar to those in
Definition 20, except that the sum restricts to only the worlds that satisfy the context
λ. Thus, the numerator can be obtained from the contextual probability in the context
κ ∧ λ excluding the worlds that violate λ. More formally, we have that∑
V∈J ,vV |=λ,V|=(CvD)κ
PJ (V) =
∑
vV |=λ,vV 6|=κ
PJ (V) +
∑
vV |=λ∧κ,V|=CvD
PJ (V)
= PB(λ)− PB(λ ∧ κ) + PP((C v D)λ∧κ)− 1 + PB(λ ∧ κ)
= PP((C v D)λ∧κ) + PB(λ)− 1.
Thus we get the following result.
Theorem 28
PK((C v D)κ | λ) = PP((CvD)
λ∧κ)+PB(λ)−1
PB(λ)
.
In particular, this means that also conditional probabilities can be computed through
contextual probabilities, with a small overhead of computing the probability (on the BN
B) of the conditioning context λ.
As in the contextual case, if one is only interested in knowing that the subsumption
is possible (that is, that it has a positive probability), then one can exploit the complex
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context describing the inconsistent contexts which, as mentioned before, can be precom-
piled to obtain the contexts in which a subsumption relation must be satisfied. However,
in this case, entailment between contexts is not sufficient; one must still compute the
probability of the contextual subsumption.
Corollary 29
Let K = (T ,B) be a consistent KB, C,D concepts, and κ, λ contexts s.t. PB(λ) > 0.
PK((C v D)κ | λ) > 0 iff PP((C v D)λ∧κ) > 1− PB(λ).
In other words, P ((C v D)κ | λ) > 0 iff C is p-subsumed by D in κ∧λ with p = 1−PB(λ).
Example 30
Continuing Example 23, suppose that we know that the context ¬X holds; that is, the
house was built before 1986. Following Theorem 28 we can compute
PK((Water v Drinkable)∅ | ¬X) = PK((Water v Drinkable)
¬X) + PB(¬X)− 1
PB(¬X)
The denominator can be read directly from the probability distribution in Figure 1;
that is, PB(¬X) = 0.3. From Theorem 22, the numerator becomes the sum of the
probabilities of all worlds that become inconsistent with the addition of the assertions
{Water(a)¬X ,¬Drinkable(a)¬X}. These are the same appearing in the last four rows of
Table 1. Hence,
PK((Water v Drinkable)∅ | ¬X) = 0.216
0.3
= 0.72.
As expected, knowing that the house is pre-1986 increases the probability of having lead
tubing, which means a decrease in the probability of drinkable water.
Analogously to Definitions 19, 20, and 27, it is possible to define the notions of con-
sistency of a concept C to hold in only some contexts, and based on it, the (potentially
conditional) probability of such a contextual consistency problem. As mentioned already,
it is well known that for every ALC interpretation I it holds that CI = ∅ iff CI ⊆ ⊥I .
Hence, all these problems can be solved through a direct reduction to their related sub-
sumption problem.
We now turn our attention to the problem of instance checking. In this problem, the
ABox also plays a role. Hence, we consider once again ontologies O that can have in
addition to GCIs, concept and role assertions.
6 Instance Checking
We consider a probabilistic extension to the classical instance checking problem. In BALC
we call this problem probabilistic instance checking and we define both a decision problem
and probability calculation for it next, following the same pattern as in the previous
section.
Definition 31 (Instance)
Given a KB K and a context κ, the individual name a is an instance of the concept C
in κ w.r.t. K, written K |= C(a)κ, iff for all probabilistic models P = (J , PJ ) of K and
for all V ∈ J it holds that V |= C(a)κ.
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That is, a is an instance of C in κ if every interpretation in each model P satisfies the
assertion C(a)κ.
Note that as before, instance checking in ALC is a special case of this definition,
that can be obtained by considering a BN with only one variable that is true with
probability 1. Notice that, contrary to the case of satisfiability studied at the end of the
previous section, it is not possible to reduce instance checking to subsumption since an
instance may be—and in fact usually is—caused by ABox assertions, which are ignored
for subsumption tests. The latter observation is not of great consequence though, since
both instance checking and subsumption can be reduced to consistency checking.
Theorem 32
Given an individual name a ∈ NI , a concept C, a context κ, and a KB K = (O,B),
K |= C(a)κ iff the KB K′ = (O ∪ {(¬C(a))κ},B) is inconsistent.
In particular, this means that instance checking is at most as hard as deciding consistency
of a KB. As mentioned already, it is also at least as hard as instance checking in the
classical ALC. Hence we get the following result.
Corollary 33
Instance checking w.r.t. BALC KBs is ExpTime-complete.
Let us now consider the probabilistic entailments related to instance checking.
Definition 34 (instance probability)
The probability of an instance in a probabilistic model P = (J , PJ ) of the KB K is
PP(C(x)κ) =
∑
V∈J ,V|=C(x)κ
PJ (V).
The instance probability w.r.t. a KB K is
PK(C(x)κ) = infP|=K
PP(C(x)κ).
The conditional probability of an instance in a particular probabilistic model P =
(J , PJ ), where PB(λ) > 0, is
PP(C(x)κ | λ) =
∑
V∈J ,vV |=λ,V|=C(x)κ PJ (V)
PB(λ)
,
The probability of the conditional instance in K is:
PK(C(x)κ | λ) = infP|=KPP(C(x)
κ | λ)
The probability of all instance checks for an inconsistent KB is always 1 to keep our
definitions consistent with probability theory, just as we did for the probability of sub-
sumption over an inconsistent KB in the previous section.
As we did for subsumption, we can exploit the reasoning techniques that were de-
veloped for deciding inconsistency of a BALC KB to find out also the contextual and
conditional probabilities of an instance. Moreover, the method can be further optimised
in the cases where we are only interested in probabilistic bounds. In particular, we can
adapt Theorem 28 to this case, yielding the following result.
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Theorem 35
PK(C(x)κ | λ) = PK(C(x)
κ∧λ)+PB(λ)−1
P (λ) .
Example 36
Suppose that we extend the ontology from Example 7 with the assertions Pipe(p)¬X ,
Lead(m)Z , and contains(p,m)¬Y . To compute PK(LeadPipe(p)∅) we must find out what
PB(¬X,¬Y,Z) is. Following the chain rule from the BN, this is computed as P (¬X)P (¬Y |
¬X)P (Z | ¬X,¬Y ) = 0.3 · 0.3 · 0.6 = 0.054. That is, even though we have (probabilis-
tic) information about a pipe p, which may contain a material which may be lead, the
probability that p is a lead pipe is very low.
With Theorem 35, we conclude the technical analysis of contextual and probabilistic
reasoning tasks over BALC KBs. As it can be readily seen, the general approach is based
on being able to detect the contexts in which the conditions imposed by the ontology are
inconsistent. The probabilistic computations rely on cross-checking those contexts with
the distribution described by the BN.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a new probabilistic extension of the DL ALC, which is based on the
ideas of Bayesian ontology languages. In this setting, knowledge bases contain certain
knowledge, which is dependent on the uncertain context where it holds. Our work ex-
tends the results on BEL (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2014; Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2014) to a
propositionally closed ontology language. The main notions follow the basic ideas of gen-
eral Bayesian ontology languages as presented in (Ceylan and Pen˜aloza 2017); however,
by focusing on a specific logic—rather than on a general notion of ontology language—we
are able to produce a tableaux-based decision algorithm for KB consistency, in contrast
to the generic black-box algorithms which exist in the literature. Our algorithm extends
the classical tableau algorithm for ALC with techniques originally developed for axiom
pinpointing. The main differences in our approach are the use of multi-valued variables
in the definition of the contexts, and the possibility of having complex contexts (instead
of only unique variables) labelling individual axioms. In general, we have shown that
adding context-based uncertainty to an ontology does not increase the complexity of
reasoning in this logic: all (probabilistic) reasoning problems can still be solved in ex-
ponential time. Of course, this tight complexity bound is not extremely surprising given
the ExpTime-hardness of the underlying classical DL.
Theorems 13–16 yield an effective decision method for BALC KB consistency, through
the computation and handling of two complex contexts, which describe the logical and
probabilistic properties of the worlds and the restricted ontologies they define. Notice that
φB can be computed in linear time on the size of B, and satisfiability of the context φ⊥K∧φB
can be checked in non-deterministic polynomial time in the size of this context, following
techniques akin to those from propositional satisfiability (Biere et al. 2009). However, the
tableau algorithm for computing φ⊥K is not optimal w.r.t. worst-case complexity. In fact,
this algorithm requires double exponential time in the worst case, although the context
it computes is only of exponential size. The benefit of this method, as in the classical
case, is that it provides a better behaviour in the average case; indeed, depending on the
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input ontology, it may not need to verify all the possible contexts, but simply construct
a model. As a simple example, if the TBox is empty, the process stops in exponential
time. To further improve the efficiency of our approach, one can think of adapting the
methods from (Zese et al. 2018) to construct a compact representation of the context—
akin to a binary decision diagram (BDD) (Lee 1959; Brace et al. 1990) for multi-valued
variables—allowing for efficient weighted model counting. A task for future work is to
exploit these data structures for practical development of our methods.
Recall that the most expensive part of our approach is the computation of the context
φ⊥K. By slightly modifying the KB, we have shown that one computation of this context
suffices to solve different problems of interest; in particular, contextual and conditional
entailments—being subsumption, satisfiability, or instance checking—can be solved using
φ⊥K′ , for an adequately constructed K′, regardless of the contexts under consideration.
An important next step will be to implement the methods described here, and compare
the efficiency of our system to other probabilistic DL reasoners based on similar semantics.
In particular, we would like to compare against the tools from (Zese et al. 2018). Even
though this latter system is also based on an extension of the tableaux algorithm for
DLs, and use multiple-world semantics closely related to ours, a direct comparison would
be unfair. Indeed, (Zese et al. 2018) makes use of stronger independence assumptions
than ours. However, a well-designed experiment can shed light on the advantages and
disadvantages of each method.
Another interesting problem for future work is to extend the query language beyond
instance queries. To maintain some efficiency, this may require some additional restric-
tions on the language or the probabilistic structure. A more detailed study of this issue
is needed.
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